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CONTRACT TEXTS, CONTRACT TEACHING,
CONTRACT LAW: COMMENT ON LAWRENCE
CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD
Brian H. Bix *
Abstract: Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World offers a good starting
place for necessary conversations about how contract law should be taught, and, more
generally, for when and how cases—in summary form or in longer excerpts—are useful in
teaching the law. This Article tries to offer some reasons for thinking that their prevalence
may reflect important truths about contract law in particular and law and legal education in
general.

INTRODUCTION
Those of us who have been teaching law for a long time, and have
been teaching contract law for a long time, are experts of a sort about
teaching that subject. Just ask us—we’ll tell you. We are also—most of
us, anyway—complete amateurs. Few among us have done, for example,
any empirical work about the relative benefits of different kinds of
casebooks or different kinds of teaching styles. I belong to the general
majority of law professors who can only offer armchair speculations.
And like the general majority of law professors, I will not allow the lack
of informed expertise to prevent me from expressing opinions—lots of
them, and with unwarranted confidence.
In this article, I will use Lawrence Cunningham’s wonderful book,
Contracts in the Real World, 1 as the starting point for some reflections
on contract law textbooks, teaching contract law, and contract law itself.
Part I considers what one might learn from a broad overview of contract
law texts. Part II offers a brief defense of using more full judicial
opinions (or at least substantial excerpts), rather than case summaries or
simply lists of doctrinal rules, in teaching contract law. Part III offers
some reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of using cases
* Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota Law School.
Many of my biases on both Contract Law and teaching Contract Law are on display in BRIAN H.
BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY AND CONTEXT (2012). I am grateful for the comments and
suggestions of the editors of this journal.
1. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012).
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involving well-known persons and events in contract law texts.
I.

CONTRACT TEXTS

In looking for texts on contract law, there are two major alternative
categories. On one hand are the type of texts that have been used to
teach contract law since contract law scholar and Harvard Law School
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell first put forward the basic
theoretical and pedagogical idea over a century ago 2: course-books that
are basically case-books. Such texts are primarily lightly edited versions
of reported judicial opinions, generally from appellate courts. 3 Because
of the influence of the American legal realists, who criticized the belief
that legal reasoning could or should rely entirely on the analysis of
cases, we now have some discussions of policy and theory interspersed
with the cases. 4 However, most of the pages in these course-books
remain devoted to the texts of actual opinions.
On the other hand are treatises, where the text contains primarily
declarations of the doctrinal rules. 5 To a varying extent, a treatise may
also contain quick summaries of some of the more important or
instructive cases. Study aids 6 tend to have the general structure of
treatises, though on a smaller scale, focusing on declaring the rules, with
occasional reference to case summaries.7
2. For an overview of Langdell’s approach to law and legal education see, for example, Thomas
C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
3. E.g., IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (8th ed. 2012); RANDY E.
BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (4th ed. 2008); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL.,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2013); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2012); CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L.
CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2d ed. 2013); DANIEL MARKOVITS,
CONTRACT LAW AND LEGAL METHODS (2012); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT
LAW AND THEORY (5th ed. 2013).
4. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A.
Reed eds., 1993) (giving excerpts from realist writers, indicating their views on legal realism,
judging, legal education, and other topics); BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT
193–204 (6th ed. 2012) (overview of legal realism).
5. E.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2011); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2009).
6. E.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(7th ed. 2013); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (2d ed. 2009); CLAUDE D.
ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL (7th ed. 2010).
7. One can also find texts—especially among books devoted primarily to the drafting of
contracts—that provide the sort of problem-based approach more commonly associated with
business school courses. E.g., SUE PAYNE, BASIC CONTRACT DRAFTING ASSIGNMENTS: A
NARRATIVE APPROACH (2011); DAVID ZARFES & MICHAEL L. BLOOM, CONTRACTS: A
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That summaries of cases—and predominantly reported appellate
cases—still dominate teaching texts in contract law (and most other firstyear law school courses) is itself an interesting story. The standard
progress story of the history of American legal thought 8 is that the legal
realists showed: (1) that formalist approaches to legal reasoning and
judicial reasoning were unsustainable—based inevitably on bias and prejudgment; (2) that legal reasoning was not really autonomous; and (3)
that even if legal reasoning could be autonomous, it would be better if
supplemented by policy, science, and other forms of wisdom from
outside of law.
The legal realist critique left its mark on legal education, though how
large an impact it had can reasonably be debated. Is it an important
change or a trivial one that our texts are no longer subtitled “Cases on
Contracts,” but now are subtitled “Cases and Materials on Contracts”? 9
As reflected in these texts, the vast majority of contract law courses go
beyond mere close reading of the judicial opinions, adding some amount
of economic analysis, contract theory, critical reflections, and whatever
else might fit under the broad realist rubric of “policy.” At the same
time, most contract law course-books and most contract law courses
continue to rely primarily on the close reading of judicial opinions, and
primarily opinions from appellate courts. 10 Whatever “policy,”
theoretical, or inter-disciplinary content is present is marginal. At the
same time, an observer sympathetic to the lessons of legal realism would
note that it is a sign of realism’s success that first-year law school
courses now, almost universally, no longer focus exclusively on cases.
The courses, as taught, now support the view that non-doctrinal
arguments are proper subjects of study in a law school and that these
extra-legal (non-doctrinal) arguments are both appropriate and, in the
hardest cases, likely inescapable.
One can come at the same set of questions about the role of cases in
understanding contract law from the other direction. Even (or especially)
when we are not worried about the teaching of first-year law students, it
is still hard to escape individual cases entirely. As mentioned, treatises

TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH (2011). However, these approaches remain very much a small
minority, especially in the texts used for first-year contract law courses.
8. I confess to being guilty of contributing to or reinforcing this narrative. See BIX, supra note 4,
at 193–204.
9. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 3 (“Cases and Materials” in subtitle of textbook);
KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3 (same).
10. In a growing number of courses the traditional focus on the close reading of cases is now
supplemented by contract drafting exercises.
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(and even most study aids) contain some case summaries, however
condensed. It is worth considering why this role for cases (in full
opinions, excerpted opinions, or summaries) remains so pervasive. Is it
merely the residue of Langdellian formalism that we lack the energy or
courage to finally shake off?
Perhaps the persistence of cases in course-books (including Contracts
in the Real World) could be explained in terms of pedagogy. Even if one
did not accept the Langdellian view, one still might believe that firstyear law school courses are meant to teach not only the doctrinal rules of
the courses in question, but also to teach certain basic skills: for
example, how to read cases and how to argue within a precedential
system (using prior cases as authority, or distinguishing prior cases,
among other skills). Contracts in the Real World in fact takes the
students through their paces this way in a fairly effective manner. For
example, at one point the book offers the following question of analysis:
how does a couple in a separation agreement making a mutual mistake
about the value of shares of a not-yet-discovered Ponzi scheme fit into a
line of cases involving mutual mistakes about whether a rare dime was
forged, whether a violin was in fact a Stradivarius, and whether a cow
was in fact barren? 11
Accepting that one use for cases in course-books is to help train
students in different kinds of case analysis, one suspects that the ubiquity
of case excerpts and summaries in both course-books and treatises
reflects something beyond pedagogical value for training students to
“think like a lawyer.” In part, the presence of cases may reflect a
different aspect of teaching: that certain doctrines cannot be clearly
explained without examples. Consider the following “black-letter rule,”
taken from the Second Restatement:
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged, unless the language or the circumstance indicate the
contrary. 12
We can put aside for the moment that the text (like other provisions in
the Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code) looks like it was
badly translated from the Latin. 13 How should such a rule be applied?
11. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 59–66.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
13. I do not mean to be too critical. As someone who has worked as a Reporter on a proposed
uniform law (the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act), this author knows only too well
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What is meant by “impracticable” and an event’s non-occurrence being
“a basic assumption on which [a] contract is made”? The doctrine begins
to take clearer shape when we see a case in which the doctrine was held
inapplicable to a situation where a Fortune 500 company was losing two
million dollars a day. 14 And the Restatement itself is a document that
understands the need for, or at least the value of, examples, as almost
every Restatement section is followed by short “illustrations” (the
impracticability section just quoted is followed by six “comments” and
sixteen “illustrations”).
Additionally, I would speculate that the prevalence of case summaries
likely reflects a number of considerations, including an uncertainty or
flexibility intrinsic, if not to all law all of the time, at least to certain
areas of law. The great cases contain rich facts that ground conflicting
moral principles and intuitions. Sometimes these cases are open to
different interpretations that would justify quite different ways of
applying the “rule” of that case to subsequent cases. At other times, it is
not that the meaning of the case is uncertain so much as the clash of
interests, values, and arguments is so nicely poised in the case, and the
conflict so well-handled in the opinion, that the case repays frequent rereading. 15 It is not an accident that cases like Hadley v. Baxendale, 16
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 17 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S.
International Sales Corp., 18 and Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell
Oil Co. 19 appear in almost every contract law course-book and treatise,
almost always with extensive quotations from the opinion, or at least an

how hard it is to draft language that is both precise and understandable; and, in legal documents, it
is usually the clarity that gets sacrificed first (and properly so).
14. Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 1112, 1117 (6th Cir. 1991). And
it may round out the complexities of the doctrine further to note that in the case both the trial court
and a dissenting judge on appeal thought that the doctrine was in principle applicable to those facts.
Id. at 1124 (Ryan, J., dissenting). This case is used by a number of contract law course-books. See,
e.g., KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3, at 691–700.
15. From the point of view of law professors, who often teach the same cases, year after year,
over the course of decades, there is obvious value to cases that do not become stale upon the 20th
reading and public discussion. (One knows the uncharitable excuse for frequent new editions of
course-books—that they are meant to force students to buy new books rather than used copies—but
new editions may also be an unintended mercy for the teachers, who might otherwise be unable to
bring any interest or energy to lesser cases that have been taught too many times before. Changing
many “second-tier” cases every few years, through the revised editions, helps veteran teachers make
it through a few more repetitions of the same course.)
16. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
17. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
18. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
19. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
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extensive paraphrase of the case’s facts. These are cases that both
students and contract law scholars can argue about endlessly, without
reaching any consensus either about the rightness of the result or about
the “lessons” that should be drawn from the cases. There is a sense that
there are subtleties and nuances and uncertainties within the law that
cannot be reduced to clear and clean descriptions of a “black-letter” rule.
That there may be a point to having some reference to the facts of
some cases is, of course, a great distance from concluding that contract
law courses should be made up primarily of the close reading of case
opinions. Perhaps contract law courses could track treatises, and mostly
describe the doctrinal rules—for my taste, also adding in some attention
to how the doctrine developed historically 20—but discussing only those
cases that display in distinctive ways the complexity or uncertainty of
the rules.
This analysis also leaves open the question of how the content of a
course—cases, rules, policy, drafting, negotiation, and so on—should be
taught. For many of us, what is taught and how it is taught are linked by
the simple truths of tradition and inertia: we teach the way we were
taught, and the way that most of our colleagues teach. And for many of
us that means using some version of the Socratic Method, with
variations on how much we rely on volunteers rather than “cold calling”
and the harshness of the responses to unprepared students and bad
answers.
A small but growing number of scholars argue that the Socratic
Method is actually, contrary to what is generally believed, an ineffective
way of teaching the law. 21 This claim is often combined with the
observation that the uniqueness of this approach to legal education is an
argument against it, not for it (noting that even when the best
universities teach their undergraduates and graduate students about
Socrates, they do not use the “Socratic Method” to do so). 22 As the
argument often continues, we unenlightened law teachers stay with the
Socratic Method because we are captured by a myth of its effectiveness,
20. For an argument by example of how such historical material helps us better to understand
some contract law doctrines, see BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT
4–11, 32–34 (2012).
21. E.g., Brian Leiter, The “Socratic Method”: The Scandal of American Legal Education,
REPORTS:
A
PHILOSOPHY
BLOG
(Oct.
20,
2003,
12:15
PM),
LEITER
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2003/10/the_socratic_me.html; cf. Andrea P. Goldin et al.,
From Ancient Greece to Modern Education: Universality and Lack of Generalization of the
Socratic Dialogue, 5 MIND, BRAIN & EDUC. 180 (2011) (in experiment, Socratic Method failed as
method of teaching mathematical truth that had been used in Plato’s Meno).
22. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 21.
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or perhaps just too timid to try something different from the way we
were taught in law school and different from the way most of our
colleagues teach. Most of us have had experience with the pushback, and
sometimes negative student evaluations, that can come with doing
anything in one’s teaching significantly different from the way students
in the other sections or even at other universities are being taught.
The idea behind the Socratic Method is relatively straight-forward, at
least for those who use the method to teach—rather than primarily to
intimidate, to use fear of embarrassment to encourage class preparation,
to obscure simple truths, or to fill out sixty minutes of class with ten
minutes of material. The positive justification for this Method is that
students will remember answers better if they reason to them on their
own, and will get better at (legal) reasoning if they practice the process
publicly while in class. On the other hand, if students become
preoccupied with avoiding being called on, or with minimizing their
embarrassment when they are called on (or when they participate
voluntarily), this may deflect from learning rather than encourage it. In
any event, I must leave it to others to offer empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of this method of teaching, with the hope that many of us
would be willing to change our course if we were shown sufficient
evidence that other approaches were clearly superior.
Contracts in the Real World helps us to think through what it is we
are trying to do as law professors when we teach first-year contract law
classes, and whether we are going about it the right way. Why do we
teach through cases rather than simply giving the doctrinal rules, and
does it really benefit the students for us to try to pretend to be Socrates
in the Platonic dialogues?
II.

THE BENEFITS OF FULL OPINIONS

I am not a classical formalist who believes that all that law students
need to learn can be taught through reading judicial opinions. The
addition of contract drafting exercises, negotiation exercises, complaint
drafting work, and so on, to contract law courses clearly reflects skills
that would be valuable to most, if not all, would-be lawyers. At the same
time, I do believe that there are benefits from the close reading of
judicial opinions. 23
There are a variety of benefits to reading full judicial opinions or
23. These opinions should be both at the trial court and appellate court level; I think the continued
predominance of appellate court opinions in course-books—likely a residue of the Langdellian
approach—is a mistake.
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significant excerpts; I will mention only a few. One matter that I
emphasize to my contract law students is the importance of the
procedural posture of a case. There are different standards a court
applies in responding to a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary
judgment, a motion for a directed verdict, and a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Similarly, an appellate court
hearing an appeal will apply different standards of review depending on
at which stage of the litigation the case was resolved below. These are
basic points, but I have found that even high-ranked graduates of very
good law schools seem to miss these basic procedural points in figuring
out (for example) how to argue a case on appeal. Matters of procedural
posture are most easily investigated in full opinions, or at least opinions
where the procedural posture and standards of review have not been
edited out. 24
Another element that can be missed when one has summarized cases
rather than full-text opinions is a sense of the struggles of the court,
working both within and, in a sense, against the existing doctrinal rules.
For this purpose, the well-known case of Webb v. McGowan 25 is a
classic example. In Webb, an employee had saved his employer from
death or grievous injury by using his own body to push away a heavy
falling object, and in the process the employee suffered a significant
injury. In gratitude, the employer promised the employee regular
payments until the employee died, and the employer kept that promise
until his own death, at which point his executor refused to make further
payments. 26 The employee sued to enforce the promise, but the problem
was that there did not appear to be valid consideration for the employer’s
promise; the consideration of saving the employer’s life came before the

24. Of course, in principle one could include the procedural posture of the case and the statement
of the standard of appellate review even in a brief summary—but once all of that was included, the
summary would no longer seem so brief, and any benefit in brevity relative to an opinion excerpt
would likely be lost.
25. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935). The case is also summarized in Contracts in the Real
World, CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 117–18, but I think that much of its richness is lost in the
short summary offered.
26. Of course, students ought also to be told why their cases are full of executors, testatrixes, and
the like, seemingly always refusing payment on what seem to be legally, or at least morally, strong
claims. The reason is that executors of estates and trustees of trusts, etc., may be personally liable to
other beneficiaries if they pay out on claims that are not legally well-grounded. This could lead to
discussions of whether it would be better to impose liability under a looser standard—for example,
removing liability where decisions are made in good faith or when claims have a strong moral basis
even if not legally enforceable. This could take discussion far afield, but that is always a danger
with contract law courses—they can quickly turn into courses on trusts and estates law, family law,
employment law, etc.
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promise rather than at the same time. Contract law was later changed,
establishing a limited exception to the requirement of contemporaneous
consideration, to cover cases whose facts were very similar to Webb v.
McGowan. 27 However, that justification was not available to the Webb
court, which nonetheless struggled to find a way to enforce the promise.
What makes Webb a great teaching case in my view is that it presents an
opportunity for students to follow that struggle through the reasoning of
the court, a struggle that would not be displayed in short summaries of
the case.
The Webb court begins its analysis by noting that there is existing
case law holding that where a person cares for another’s property, this
can be sufficient to ground a subsequent promise to compensate another
for the care. 28 It then notes that human life similarly has a value, as
indicated by life insurance and other forms of insurance. 29 Within legal
analysis, one sometimes must deal with legal categories and precedent
by using analogy and indirection: (1) promises to compensate for earlier
care for property are enforceable; (2) caring for another person’s health
and life are like caring for property in that both can have a monetary
value—as shown by insurance policies; and (3) therefore, promises to
pay for prior care for another person’s health or life should be
enforceable. However, the strangest part of the opinion was still to come.
The Webb court notes that there was some disagreement regarding
whether or when a prior or existing moral obligation would be sufficient
consideration to make a promise enforceable, with many courts and
commentators having held that there must be some existing legal or
equitable obligation that was for some reason unenforceable.30 The court
continues:
[W]here the promisor, having received a material benefit from
27. At least in the Restatement, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981)
(“Promise for Benefit Received”), and followed in many jurisdictions.
28. Webb, 168 So. at 197. The analysis could have gone in a slightly different direction, and
noted that emergency care for either person or property has been held to justify actions for
restitution, even without any subsequent promise to pay. This long-standing principle appears in the
recent Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment as Sections 20 and 21.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 20–21 (2011). However,
that would have been a more indirect route to showing what needed to be shown here: the
enforceability of the employer’s promise.
29. Webb, 168 So. at 197–98. There are also lessons to be learned from the efforts the Webb court
feels it needs to exert to get to what would seem an obvious point: that life is valuable, value
potentially expressible in monetary terms, and that contract law should be as willing to enforce
promises to compensate for benefits to life and health as it should be to enforce promises to
compensate for benefits to property.
30. Id. at 198.
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the promisee, [that promisor] is morally bound to compensate
him for the services rendered and in consideration of this
obligation promises to pay. In such cases the subsequent
promise to pay is an affirmance or ratification of the services
rendered carrying with it the presumption that a previous request
for the service was made . . . . McGowin’s express promise to
pay [the employee] for the services rendered [that is, saving the
employer’s life] was an affirmance or ratification of what [the
employee] had done, raising the presumption that the services
had been rendered at [the employer’s] request. 31
The Webb court thus seems to be telling us that because of the
employer’s promise to pay, we should presume that there had been a
remarkably quick and detailed discussion between the employer and
employee while the heavy object was falling, negotiating the terms of
compensation for the rescue that was in the process of occurring. This is,
of course, absurd, but it is an example of a category that all of us who
read a lot of cases come across regularly: a court using a “legal fiction” 32
or formalistic reasoning to come to a result that the court (and most
readers) finds to be right or just. Whether such outcome-determinative
practices by judges is a good thing or a bad thing (or only seems like a
good thing when the judge reaches an outcome we like) is obviously
another topic worth discussing with students in any law school course. 33
All of this comes from requiring students to read the actual opinion, and
question why the court made the arguments it did.
Complete or nearly complete excerpts of cases also allow the teacher
to emphasize many other matters: for example, the wonderful brevity of
Judge Cardozo (as he then was) in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 34 Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 35 and other cases, where every sentence
displays (or hides) an important step in a packed analysis and argument,
where doctrine, policy, “common sense,” and rhetoric intermingle
freely; an example is given in the footnote below. 36 There are
31. Id.
32. On the nature, value, and uses of legal fictions, see LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967);
Frederick
Schauer,
Legal
Fictions
Revisited
(2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904555.
33. As indicated throughout this article, there are many important topics that could, and perhaps
should, be raised in a first-year Contract Law course, but there are the countervailing pressures of
how hard it is to cover the substantive law now that most of us must squeeze the contract law course
into three or four credits, rather than six credits.
34. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
35. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
36. One of the questions in Jacob & Youngs is whether the builder was to lose all right to sue on
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comparable virtues from the more recent Richard Posner opinions,
which are now starting to populate Contract Law casebooks with almost
as great a frequency as Cardozo opinions. 37
One last small matter: full opinions allow the teacher to point out to
the student how every case requires the judge to construct a narrative,
first and foremost a narrative of what happened (the facts), and that it is
no coincidence that almost all the factual narratives in judicial opinions
display the actions underlying the case solely or primarily from the point
of view of the party that ultimately prevails in that court. The choice of
point of view is likely not conscious, but it is still important. To narrate
from the point of view of one party is a natural way to increase the
reader’s sympathy for that “protagonist.”
III. CELEBRITY CASES
I have mixed feelings about the use of cases involving celebrities,
television shows, and other well-known recent events, as Contracts in
the Real World does to a great extent, but many course-books do to some
extent. 38 On the positive side, one should not lightly dismiss a strategy
that could increase interest in a topic many law students find dry and
dreary. Cases involving actors, athletes, and politicians that students
recognize may very well increase students’ willingness to pay attention
to the cases they are required to read.
One problem is that the fame of the party could distract from the
doctrinal lesson—that students might be so caught up in liking or hating
the construction contract (for building a mansion) upon any breach, however small in importance or
value relative to the remainder of the contract (what would become the doctrine of “substantial
performance,” in contrast to the “perfect tender” in sale of goods contracts). Cardozo writes:
From the conclusion that promises may not be treated as dependent to the extent of their
uttermost minutiæ without a sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion
that they may not be so treated without a perversion of intention. Intention not otherwise
revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If something
else is in view, it must not be left to implication. There will be no assumption of a purpose to
visit venial faults with oppressive retribution.
Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891. A modern judge or commentator would likely unpack those few
sentences into an argument that went on for many pages. Students accustomed to the lengthier form
of analysis often get tripped up when trying to work through analysis as compact as Cardozo’s.
37. See, e.g., Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr. Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Posner, J.) (affirming a trial court decision that contract provisions that seem to indicate a
subjective satisfaction test should in fact be read as imposing an objective satisfaction test),
excerpted in KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3, at 484–87. For an excellent discussion of the influence and
contrasting themes of Cardozo and Posner, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A
Study in Contracts, 36 WM & MARY L. REV. 1379 (1995).
38. See, e.g., KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3, at 219–24, 1000–09 (cases involving Martin Luther
King, Jr., and former Minnesota Governor and professional wrestler, Jesse Ventura).
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Charlie Sheen, 39 in wanting him to win or lose the case, that they
become less able to focus on the intricate questions of conditions
involved in Sheen’s case. Additionally, today’s celebrity may be an
obscurity in a short time. It may not be that long before students need the
help of an internet search engine to figure out who Sheen, Sandra
Bullock, 40 Eminem, 41 Kevin Costner, 42 or Vanessa Redgrave 43 are (we
are likely already there for some of those figures).
The other risk of working to be up to date and relevant is that the
book’s narrative may be overtaken by events. For example, as already
noted, Contracts in the Real World features a case where a separation
agreement was challenged because of the parties being mutually
mistaken about the value of shares in a Madoff Ponzi scheme fund. The
book characterizes the appellate court as getting the outcome right;
however, that decision was reversed after the book was finished. 44 (Of
course, being reversed does not mean that the appellate court was
necessarily wrong, but it does indicate that there were significant
arguments for a different outcome.) 45
CONCLUSION
Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World is not only a
wonderful book about contract law and an excellent teaching tool for
contract law courses, it is also a good starting place for necessary

39. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 176–79, 181–86 (discussing case involving Sheen).
40. See id. at 186–92 (discussing case involving Bullock).
41. See id. at 126–30 (discussing case involving Eminem).
42. See id. at 172–76 (discussing case involving Costner).
43. See id. at 87–88 (discussing case involving Redgrave).
44. See id. at 59–60, 66 (discussing Simkin v. Blank, 915 N.Y.S.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011),
rev’d, 968 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2012)). It should also be noted that the text’s comment that the
property the married couple were dividing in their separation agreement was “virtually
all . . . considered jointly owned because it was obtained during their lengthy marriage,”
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 60, misstates the relevant family law principle. In a common law
property state like New York, which divides property “equitably” upon divorce, each spouse may
have a claim on an equitable portion of all property obtained during the marriage, but it is not the
case that all such property was “jointly owned.” See, e.g., BRIAN H. BIX, FAMILY LAW 153–69
(2013) (chapter on property division). One other important family law correction: the famous
“palimony” case of Marvin v. Marvin was decided by the California Supreme Court in 1976, not
1966, as the book states. Compare Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), with CUNNINGHAM,
supra note 1, at 47, 223 n.23 (giving the date as 1966).
45. While the text indicates that the best argument against the outcome in the appellate court was
the special nature of separation agreements, the decision reversing the appellate court in fact relied
primarily on a general analysis of contract law mistake doctrine. Compare CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 1, at 66, with Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 462–65.
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conversations about how contract law should be taught, and, more
generally, for when and how cases—in summary form or in longer
excerpts—are useful in teaching the law. Perhaps the use of full judicial
opinions (or long excerpts) in course-books is just a practice left over
from the bad old days of formalism, but this article has tried to offer
some reasons for thinking that their prevalence may reflect important
truths about contract law in particular and law and legal education in
general.

